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Chapter 19 of the NAFTA:
Are Binational Panels Constitutional?
J. Todd Applegate*
This comment examines whether Chapter 19 binational panels of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are constitutional under the provisions of the
U.S. Constitution. Part I examines the basic structure and process of Chapter 19 bination-
al panels. Part II takes a closer look at the method for challenging binational review panels
in U.S. courts. Part III analyzes the constitutionality of binational panels under Article II
of the U.S. Constitution. Part IV discusses the constitutionality of binational panels under
the guise of the due Process Clause. Part V examines the constitutionality question under
the Equal Protection Clause and Part VI provides a detailed analysis of binational panels
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Finally, Part VII explores cases challenging the
constitutionality of binational panels.
I. Introduction to the Basic Features of Chapter 19.
A. BACKGROUND.
Under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA, each Party "reserves the right to apply its antidumping
law and countervailing duty law to goods imported from the territory of the other Party."'
Antidumping laws were enacted to prevent exporters from discarding their products on
other countries at inequitably low prices. "Dumping" results in a material injury or the pos-
sibility of such injury to an industry and high prices in the exporter's home country.2 In the
United States, a dumping offense entails an export to the United States "priced at less than its
fair value with a resulting material injury or threat thereof to an American industry."3 A
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University, 1998.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12, 1992, revised Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
32 I.LM. 605, art. 1902(1) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [here'nafter "NAFTA"]. Article 1902(1)
also states: "[a]ntidumping law and countervailing duty law include, as appropriate for each Party,
relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice and judicial precedents.' Id
2. Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Constitutional Dimensions of the North American Free Trade
Agreemen 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 141, 144 (1994).
3. Id.
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penalty tariff is imposed "to restore the export price to fair value:'4
Countervailing duty laws were also enacted under the NAFTA to prevent exporters
from ridding themselves of their products at inequitably low prices. 5 In this situation,
however, the exporter's home country subsidizes the practice by providing a tax rebate or a
similar aid.6 A penalty tariff is imposed "to offset or countervail the government subsidy."7
The procedures for pursuing antidumping and countervailing duty actions in the
United States outside of (and prior to) the NAFTA are similar.8 A U.S. firm is entitled to
petition the Commerce Department, alleging it was harmed or is "being harmed by a for-
eign competitor's dumping or subsidy." 9 The Commerce Department then makes a pre-
liminary determination on the "less- than-fair-value" or subsidy issue, as the case may
be.10 The International Trade Commission (ITC) makes a contemporaneous preliminary
determination of possible industry injury.1 If both the Commerce Department and the
ITC make affirmative findings, the two agencies make final determinations. 12 If both the
Commerce Department and the ITC do not make affirmative findings, there is no final
determination by either agency.13 Both agencies are subject to "strict time constraints" at
4. Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988). This statute asserts that:
If the administering authority determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is
being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value, and the com-
mission determines that an industry in the United States is materially injured, or is
threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United
States is materially retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of
sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for importation, then there shall
be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping duty, in addition to any other
duty imposed, in an amount equal to the amount by which the normal value exceeds
the export price (or the constructed export price) for the merchandise. Id.
5. Metropoulos, supra note 2, at 144.
6. Id.
7. Id.19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1988). This statute asserts that:
If the administering authority determines that the government of a country or any
public entity within the territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, a
countervailable subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a
class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation,
into the United states, and in the case of merchandise imported from a Subsidies
agreement country, the Commission determines that an industry in the United states is
materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an
industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of imports of that mer-
chandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for
importation, then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing
duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net counter-
vailable subsidy. Id.







each step of the process. 14 These final determinations are appealable first to the Court of
International Trade, 15 "with a second round of appeals [available] to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit" 16
Mexico, with Canadian support, tried to win modifications in the U.S. antidumping
and countervailing duty laws, but the United States prevented the NAFTA from reaching
the substance of these laws by insisting that they remain in place. 17 This was not the first
instance in which Canada had tried to win these modifications in U.S. law.
Canada had been dissatisfied with U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws
prior to the enforcement of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1988.18 Canada was
under the impression that the U.S. administering agencies were "influenced by domestic
political considerations, with unfair results for Canadian firms.' 19 Canada sought signifi-
cant changes in the U.S. law or a move toward "common U.S.-Canadian laws interpreted
by a common tribunal," but neither option was acceptable to the United States.20
The compromise concerning binational panel review reached in the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement forms the basis for the structure of the NAFTA Chapter 19 binational
panels.2 1 As stated previously, the United States prevented the NAFTA from reaching the
substance of its antidumping and countervailing duty laws.22 The provisions adopted in
the final draft of Chapter 19 of the NAFTA are essentially the same as those adopted in the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, and focus on new procedures for the review of
antidumping and countervailing duty decisions rendered by the administrative bodies of
each country.23
B. BINATIONAL REvIEw PANELS.
The role of the binational panel is to determine whether or not the administrative
determination was "in accordance with the domestic antidumping or countervailing duty
law of the Party that rendered it."24 If necessary, the panel may remand the determination
14. Id.
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(1) (1988). Section 1516a(a)(1) provides that "an interested party who is a
party to the proceeding in connection with which the matter arises may commence an action in
the United States Court of International Trade by filing concurrently a summons, and... com-
plaint ... contesting any factual findings or legal conclusion upon which the determination is
based." Id.
16. Metropoulos, supra note 2, at 145; 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1988). Section 1295(a)(5) states that
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit "shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... of
an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court of International Trade." Id.
17. PAUL ET AL., NoRm AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 104 (Hamilton
Loeb & Michael Owen eds., 1992).
18. Metropoulos, supra note 2, at 145.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. PAuL Er AL., supra note 17,at 104.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 105; NAFTA, supra note 1, at annex 1901.2(1).
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for further proceedings consistent with the panel's decision.25 The decision of the review
panel is binding and nonreviewable, aside from a narrow exception labeled the "extraordi-
nary challenge' 26
Chapter 19 of the NAFTA provides for the establishment of independent binational
review panels consisting of five members drawn from a seventy-five person roster devel-
oped by the Parties to the suit.27 Each Party chooses two panelists, and these choices are
25. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904(8). Article 1904(8) sets forth the guidelines for remanding a
final determination:
The panel may uphold a final determination, or remand it for action not inconsistent
with the panel's decision. Where the panel remands a final determination, the panel shall
establish as brief a time as is reasonable for compliance with the remand, taking into
account the complexity of the factual and legal issues involved and the nature of the
panel's decision. In no event shall the time permitted for compliance with a remand
exceed an amount of time equal to the maximum amount of time (counted from the
date of the filing of a petition, complaint or application) permitted by statute for the
competent investigating authority in question to make a final determination in an inves-
tigation. If review of the action taken by the competent investigating authority on
remand is needed, such review shall be before the same panel, which shall normally issue
a final decision within 90 days of the date on which such remand is submitted to it. Id
26. Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Binational Panels as the Trade Courts of Last
Resort, 27 INT'L LAw 707, 709 (1993).
27. NAFTA, supra note 1, at annex 1901.2. Annex 1901.2 describes the procedures for establishing
binational panels:
1. On the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties shall establish and there-
after maintain a roster of individuals to serve as panelists in disputes under this Chapter.
The roster shall include judges or former judges to the fullest extent practicable. The
Parties shall consult in developing the roster, which shall include at least 75 candidates.
Each Party shall select at least 25 candidates, and all candidates shall be citizens of Canada,
Mexico or the United States. Candidates shall be of good character, high standing and
repute, and shall be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability, sound judgment
and general familiarity with international trade law. Candidates shall not be affiliated
with a Party, and in no event shall a candidate take instructions from a Party. The Parties
shall maintain the roster, and may amend it, when necessary, after consultations.
2. A majority of the panelists on each panel shall be lawyers in good standing. Within 30
days of a request for a panel, each involved Party shall appoint two panelists, in consulta-
tion with the other involved Party. The involved Parties normally shall appoint panelists
from the roster. If a panelist is not selected from the roster, the panelist shall be chosen in
accordance with and be subject to the criteria of paragraph 1. Each involved Party shall
have the right to exercise four peremptory challenges, to be exercised simultaneously and
in confidence, disqualifying from appointment to the panel up to four candidates pro-
posed by the other involved Party. Peremptory challenges and the selection of alternative
panelists shall occur within 45 days of the request for the panel. If an involved Party fails
to appoint its members to a panel within 30 days or if a panelist is struck and no alterna-
tive panelist is selected within 45 days, such panelist shall be selected by lot on the 31st or
46th day, as the case may be, from that Party's candidates on the roster.
3. Within 55 days of the request for a panel, the involved Parties shall agree on the selec-
tion of a fifth panelist. If the involved Parties are unable to agree, they shall decide by lot
which of them shall select, by the 61st day, the fifth panelist from the roster, excluding can-
didates eliminated by peremptory challenges.
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subject to challenge by the other Party.28 The Parties either agree on a fifth panelist or
select the fifth panelist by lot if an agreement cannot be reached. 29 Although panelists are
not required to be lawyers, a majority of each panel, including the chairperson, must be
lawyers in good standing. 30 The NAFTA states that the roster should include judges or
former judges "to the fullest extent practicable."31
The independent binational review panels take the place of judicial review of final
administrative antidumping or countervailing duty decisions of one Party that involve goods
imported from another Party.32 Panel review of a final administrative antidumping or coun-
4. On appointment of the fifth panelist, the panelists shall promptly appoint a chairman
from among the lawyers on the panel by majority vote of the panelists. If there is no
majority vote, the chairman shall be appointed by lot from among the lawyers on the
panel.
5. Decisions of the panel shall be by majority vote and based on the votes of all members
of the panel. The panel shall issue a written decision with reasons, together with any dis-
senting or concurring opinions of panelists.
6. Panelists shall be subject to the code of conduct established pursuant to article 1909. If
an involved Party believes that a panelist is in violation of the code of conduct, the
involved Parties shall consult and if they agree, the panelist shall be removed and a new
panelist shall be selected in accordance with the procedures of this Annex.
7. When a panel is convened pursuant to Article 1904 each panelist shall be required to sign:
(a) an application for protective order for information supplied by the United States or
its persons covering business proprietary and other privileged information;
(b) an undertaking for information supplied by Canada or its persons covering
confidential, personal, business proprietary and other privileged information; or
(c) an undertaking for information supplied by Mexico or its persons covering
confidential, business proprietary and other privileged information.
8. On a panelist's acceptance of the obligations and terms of an application for protective
order or disclosure undertaking, the importing Party shall grant access to the information
covered by such order or disclosure undertaking. Each Party shall establish appropriate
sanctions for violations of protective orders or disclosure undertakings issued by or given
to any Party. Each Party shall enforce such sanctions with respect to any person within its
jurisdiction. Failure by a panelist to sign a protective order or disclosure undertaking shall
result in disqualification of the panelist.
9. If a panelist becomes unable to fulfill panel duties or is disqualified, proceedings of the
panel shall be suspended pending the selection of a substitute panelist in accordance with
the procedures of this annex.
10. Subject to the code of conduct established pursuant to Article 19099, and provided
that it does not interfere with the performance of the duties of such panelist, a panelist
may engage in other business during the term of the panel.
11. While acting as a panelist, a panelist may not appear as counsel before another panel.
12. With the exception off violations of protective orders or disclosure undertakings,
signed pursuant to paragraph 7, panelists shall be immune from suit and legal process






32. PAUL ET AL., supra note 17, at 104.
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tervailing duty determination is not automatic, however.33 If panel review is not requested,
domestic judicial review procedures still apply.34 Even if panel review is requested, the panel
must apply the same domestic substantive law that the administering agency applies, which
includes "the relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice, and
judicial precedents to the extent that a court of [the] importing Party would rely on such
materials in reviewing a final determination of the competent investigating authority."35
C. EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE PROCEDURES.
Extraordinary challenge procedures are available only under the unusual circumstances
of gross misconduct, bias, breach of fundamental procedures, or action that manifestly
exceeds the authority panels have been given.36 The Party bringing the challenge must also
establish that the action materially affected the panel's decision and that the decision threatens
the integrity of the binational panel review process.37 The committee can review the bina-
tional review panel proceedings to determine whether: (1) grounds exist to remand the panel
decision; (2) to dismiss the decision and entrust the case to a new panel; or (3) whether the
decision should be affirmed.38 "If the complaining Party fails to establish any of the three
requirements, the committee must affirm the panel's decision " 39
33. Id. at 105.
34. Id.
35. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904(2). Article 1904(2) states that:
An involved Party may request that a panel review, based on the administrative record,
a final antidumping or countervailing duty determination of a competent investigating
authority of an importing Party to determine whether such determination was in
accordance with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing Party.
For this purpose, the antidumping or countervailing duty law consists of the relevant
statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice and judicial precedents
to the extent that a court of the importing Party would rely on materials in reviewing a
final determination of the competent investigating authority. Solely for purposes of
the panel review provided for in this Article, the antidumping and countervailing duty
statutes of the Parties, as those statutes may be amended from time to time, are incor-
porated into and made a part of this Agreement.
Id.
36. Id.; NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904(13)(a). Article 1904(13)(a) allows a Party to pursue the
extraordinary challenge procedure where, within a reasonable time after the panel decision is
issued, the Party alleges that:
(i) [A] member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a serious conflict
of interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules of conduct, (ii) the panel serious-
ly departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, or (iii) the panel manifestly exceed-
ed its powers, authority or jurisdiction set out in this Article...
Id.
37. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904(13)(b). Article 1904(13)(b) lists a further requirement that
"any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has materially affeced the panel's decision and
threatens the integrity of the binational panel review process" before a Party may seek to invoke
the extraordinary challenge procedure. Id.
38. PAUL ET AL., supra note 17,at 105.
39. Ethan Boyer, Article III, The Foreign Relations Power, and the Binational Panel System of NAFTA,
13 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw 101,112 (1996).
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Extraordinary challenge committees consist of three members, one member chosen
by each of the two Parties from a roster selected by the Parties and the third chosen from
the roster by the Party designated by lot to so choose.40 Regardless of whether the com-
mittee decides to affirm, vacate, or remand the panel's decision, the committee must issue
its opinion within 90 days of the request for extraordinary challenge review. 4 1
D. SPECIAL COMMITrEES.
Along with the above provisions, Chapter 19 of the NAFTA includes procedures by
which a Party can "seek to ensure that another Party's domestic law does not operate to
prevent the establishment, functioning, or effectiveness of the binational review panel
process." 42 A Party alleging such a hindrance may seek consultations with the other Party,
but if consultation does not resolve the dispute, the matter is committed to a special three
member committee chosen from the same roster and in the same manner as the commit-
40. Id. NAFrA, supra note 1, at annex 1904.13. Annex 1904.13 describes the extraordinary challenge
procedure:
The involved Parties shall establish an extraordinary challenge committee, composed
of three members, within 15 days of a request pursuant to Article 1904(13). The mem-
bers shall be selected from a 15-personn roster comprised of judges or former judges
of a federal judicial court of the United States or a judicial court of superior jurisdic-
tion of Canada, or a federal judicial court of Mexico. Each Party shall name five per-
sons to this roster. Each involved Party shall select one member from this roster and
the involved Parties shall decide by lot which of them shall select the third member
from the roster.
2. The Parties shall establish by the date of entry into force of the Agreement rules of
procedure for committees. The rules shall provide for a decision of a committee with-
in 90 days of its establishment.
3. Committee decisions shall be binding on the Parties with respect to the particular
matter between the Parties that was before the panel. After examination of the legal
and factual analysis underlying the findings and conclusions of the panel's decision in
order to determine whether one of the grounds set out in Article 1904(13) has been
established, and on finding that one of those grounds has been established, the com-
mittee shall vacate the original panel decision or remand it to the original panel for
action not inconsistent with the committee's decision; if the grounds are not estab-
lished, it shall deny the challenge and, therefore, the original panel decision shall stand
affirmed. If the original decision is vacated, a new panel shall be established pursuant
to annex 1901.2.
Id.
41. NAFTA, supra note 1, at annex 1904.13(2).
42. PAUL ET AL., supra note 17, at 106.
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tee under the extraordinary review procedure.43
If the committee finds that a Party's domestic law interferes with the binational review
panel process, it can order the Parties to undergo consultation in order to resolve the dis-
pute.44 But if the consultation does not result in a resolution, the complaining Party can
either suspend operation of the panel process for decisions involving the other party or
suspend against that Party such benefits as may be appropriate under the circumstances. 45
The defending or opposing Party is not left defenseless, however. 46 That Party may recon-
vene the special committee to determine if the problem has been corrected, in which case
43. 1& NAFTA, supra note 1, at annex 1905.6. Annex 1905.6 describes the special committee procedures:
The Parties shall establish rules of procedure by the date of entry into force of this
Agreement in accordance with the following principles:
(a) the procedures shall assure a right to at least one hearing before the special commit-
tee as well as the opportunity to provide initial and rebuttal written submissions;
(b) the procedures shall assure that the special committee shall prepare an initial
report typically within 60 days of the appointment of the last member, and shall
afford the Parties 14 days to comment on that report prior to issuing a final report
30 days after presentation of the initial report;
(c) the special committee's hearings, deiberations and initial report, and all written
submissions to, and communications with, the special committee shall be confidential;
(d) unless the Parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the decision of the special
committee shall be published 10 days after it is transmitted to the disputing Parties,
along with any separate opinions of individual members and any written views that
either Party may wish to be published; and(e) unless the Parties to the dispute otherwise agree, meetings and hearings of the
special committee shall take place at the office of the Section of the Secretariat of
the Party complained against.
IM.
44. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1905(7). Article 1905(7) provides that "[wihere the special commit-
tee makes an affirmative finding... The complaining Party and the Party complained against
shall begin consultations within 10 days thereafter and shall seek to achieve a mutually satisfacto-
ry solution within 60 days of the issuance of the. committee's report" Id.
45. PAUL ET AL., supra note 17, at 106; NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1905(8). Article 1905(8) explains
the allowed procedure when consultations do not result in a resolution:
If, within the 60-day period, the Parties are unable to reach a mutually satisfactory
solution to the matter, or the Party complained against has not demonstrated to the
satisfaction of the special committee that it has corrected the problem or problems
with respect to which the committee has made an affirmative finding, the complaining
Party may suspend:
(a) the operation of article 1904 with respect to the Party complained against; or(b) the application to the Party complained against of such benefits under this
Agreement as may be appropriate under the circumstances. If the complaining Party
decides to take action under this paragraph, it shall do so within 30 days after the end
of the 60-day consultation period.
Id.
46. PAUL ET AL., supra note 17, at 106; NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1905(10).
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the remedial actions taken by the complaining Party must be terminated. 47
E. REVIEw OF ANTIDUMPING & COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW AMENDMENTS.
Chapter 19 of the NAFTA also contains two provisions regarding the amendment of
antidumping and countervailing duty statutes.48 The first provision states that such an
amendment will apply only to goods from other Parties if the amendment specifies that it
so applies. 49 The second provision establishes that a Party may request a binational panel
to issue a declaratory opinion stating whether or not the other Party's antidumping or
countervailing duty law amendment "conforms to the above standards and has the func-
tion or effect of overturning the prior decision of a bilateral review panel."50
If the panel declares that the amendment does not conform to the standards, the
Parties can negotiate possible modifications for ninety days.5 1 If no modifications are
made within nine months of the termination of the consultation period, the challenging
party may retaliate by amending its own law or by terminating the NAFTA.
52
47. PAUL ET AL., supra note 17, at 106; NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1905(10). Article 1905(10) states:
On the request of the party complained against, the special committee shall reconvene to deter-
mine whether:
(a) the suspension of benefits by the complaining Party pursuant to paragraph 8(b) is
manifestly excessive; or
(b) the Party complained against has corrected the problem or problems with respect
to which the committee has made an affirmative finding. The special committee shall,
within 45 days of the request, present a report to both Parties containing its determi-
nation. Where the special committee determines that the Party complained against
has corrected the problem or problems, any suspension effected by the complaining
Party or the Party complained against, or both, pursuant to paragraph 8 or 9 shall be
terminated.
Id.
48. PAUL ET AL., supra note 17, at 106.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 107.
51. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1903(3)(a). Article 1903(3)(a) states:
[In the event that the panel recommends modifications to the amending statute to
remedy a non-conformity that it has identified in its opinion:] (a) the two Parties shall
immediately begin consultations and shall seek to achieve a mutually satisfactory solu-
tion to the matter within 90 days of the issuance of the panel's final declaratory opin-
ion. Such solution may include seeking corrective legislation with respect to the
statute of the amending Party.
Id.
52. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1903(3)(b). Article 1903(3)(b) states:
[I]f corrective legislation is not enacted within nine months from the end of the 90-
day consultation period referred to in subparagraph:
(a) and no other mutually satisfactory solution has been reached, the Party that
requested the panel may (I) take comparable legislative or equivalent executive action,
or (ii) terminate this agreement with regard to the amending Party on 60-day written
notice to that Party.
Id.
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II. Method for Challenging Binational Review Panels in U.S. Courts.
A. EXAMINATION OF THE PROCESS.
As stated earlier, the NAFTA provides for constitutional challenges to the binational
panel process itself, as opposed to antidumping and countervailing duty challenges,
through the extraordinary challenge procedure.53 These challenges in the United States
must be filed in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit within thirty
days of the disputed panel decision. 54 The District of Columbia Circuit Court decision
may be appealed to the United States Supreme Court within ten days after issuance. 55
However, despite the availability of constitutional challenges, only two cases have raised
such a challenge, "and neither ... led to a decision on the merits"' 56
The lack of constitutional challenges may be due in part to the limited circumstances
in which these challenges are available, as discussed earlier.57 But the lack of cases may
also be explained by legal obstacles that perhaps "discourage parties from seeking judicial
review" on constitutional grounds.58 These obstacles provide little or no incentive for a
Party to pursue such review.59
B. OBSTACLES TO CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES OF BINATIONAL PANELS.
1. Financial Disincentive.
Under U.S. law, there is "a strong financial disincentive to challenging the [binational)
panel process." 6 0 The NAFTA implementing legislation "requires the Party filing a consti-
tutional challenge to pay the opponent's litigation costs if the challenge is
unsuccessful.' 6 1Even though under the above legislation the court has discretion not to
53. See supra notes 36-39.
54. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(C) (1994). Section 1516a(g)(4)(C) provides that:
Within 30 days after the date of publication in the federal register of notice that bina-
tional panel review has been completed, an interested party who is a party to the pro-
ceeding in connection with which the matter arises may commence an action ... by fil-
ing an action in accordance with the rules of the court.
Id.
55. Id. at § 1516a(g)(4)(H). This section states that "any final judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which is issued pursuant to an action brought under
subparagraph (A) shall be reviewable by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United
States ... within 10 days after such order is entered." I&
56. Robert P. Deyling, Free Trade Agreements and the Federal Courts: Emerging Issues, 27 ST. MARY's
L.J. 353, 379 (1996).
57. See supra notes 36-39.
58. Deyling, supra note 56, at 379.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(F)(ii) (1994). This statute states that if a court upholds the con-
stitutionality of the determination in question, the court "shall" award fees and expenses, as well
as any additional incurred costs, to the prevailing party, unless the court finds the position of the
other party substantially justified or that special circumstances would make such an award
unjust. Id.
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award fees and expenses if the court finds the claim was substantially justified or that spe-
cial circumstances make an award unjust, the potential of having to pay costs if a challenge
is unsuccessful is "likely to be a strong deterrent" to pursuing such a challenge. 62
2. Executive and Legislative Barriers.
The executive and legislative branches have "blunted the practical value of judicial
review by assuring that the underlying panel decision will continue to be binding, at least
in the case under review."63 In 1989 President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,662, stat-
ing the President accepts "as a whole, all decisions of binational panels and extraordinary
challenge committees."64 "The President may direct the Commerce Department to take
action consistent with the panel decision;' and "neither the President's actions, nor the
agency's action at the direction of the President, are subject to judicial review " 65 Prior to
this Executive Order, Congress passed the aforementioned NAFTA implementing legisla-
tion, one provision of which establishes that the President may accept binational decisions,
even if they are held unconstitutional. 66
The executive and congressional actions described above combine to form a signifi-
cant obstacle to raising a constitutional challenge to a binational panel decision in the
United States.67 "The only incentive for seeking judicial review would be the possible
effect of a favorable judicial decision on the future of the panel process as a whole," but
"the result in the underlying case would not change."68 Coupled with the financial disin-
centive to make a constitutional challenge, it is no wonder that only two cases have chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the binational panel process.
III. Binational Panels & Constitutionality Under Article II of the
U.S. Constitution.
A. APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE.
Under Article II, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution, the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint "all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,.., but the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
62. Deyling, supra note 56, at 380.
63. Id.
64. Exec. Order No. 12,662,3 C.F.R. 624 (1989), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1994).
65. Deyling, supra note 56, at 380.66. 19 US.C. § 1516a(g) (7) (B) (1994).
67. Deyling, supra note 56, at 380.
68. Id.
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alone, to the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." 69 This provision of the
Constitution requiring that Officers of the United States be appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate is commonly known as the Appointments Clause.70 Exactly who
is an "Officer" of the United States is a question that was addressed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in a 1976 case, Buckley v. Valeo.7 1
B. BUCKLEY V. VALEO.
The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo interpreted the Appointments Clause to mean
that individuals who exercise "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States" must be appointed by the President, with the confirmation by the Senate. 72 It is
argued that the binational panel system does not comply with the Appointments Clause
"[s]ince at least three members of each panel are foreign, and the American members are
not appointed by the President.' 73 Although panel members are not appointed by the
President, a strong argument can be made that binational panels are constitutional under
Article II of the Constitution. 74
C. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BINATIONAL PANELS
UNDER ARTICLE II.
Persuasive arguments exist to refute the constitutional argument that binational panels
do not comply with the Appointments Clause.75 The first of these arguments is that the
Appointments Clause does not apply to binational panels because they act pursuant to inter-
national law, not U.S. law.76 Under this argument, the panel derives its authority exclusively
from the Free Trade Agreement itself rather than from the laws of the United States.77
69. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl.2. The full text of article II, § 2, clause 2, states:
He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise pro-
vided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone,
to the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Id.
70. Deyling, supra note 56, at 377.
71. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
72. Bucdey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 126. The Court in Buckley examined whether the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) was exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States
in order to decide whether FEC members could be appointed by officials other than the
President. Id. The Court held that the FEC met the definition of exercising significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States and required any individual determined to be an officer
of the United States to be subject to the Appointments Clause. Id.
73. Deyling, supra note 56, at 378.
74. See William J. Davey, The Appointments Clause and International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms:
A False Conflict, 49 WASH & LEE L. REv. 1315, 1316-17 (1992).
75. See id.
76. Id.; Moyer, supra note 26, at 712.
77. Davey, supra note 74, at 1316.
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Another argument for not applying the Appointments Clause to binational panels
states that the panel process is in essence an international arbitration, which is outside the
scope of the Appointments Clause as set forth in Article 11.78
A third argument supporting the constitutionality of binational panels under Article
II is that U.S. panelists qualify as inferior officers under the Appointments Clause and
Canadian and Mexican panelists need not qualify because they act pursuant to their own
respective laws.79 Since the panelists are inferior officers, they need not be appointed by
the President under Article 11.80
Finally, an argument can be made that "U.S. courts traditionally defer to the President
in the conduct of foreign relations."8'
Based upon the above arguments, Chapter 19 binational panels withstand constitutional
attack under the Article II provisions of the U.S. Constitution.8 2 The ultimate assessment of
Chapter 19 binational panels under Article II is that "the foreign affairs powers of the
Executive and the Congress are implicated and that the President and Congress cooperated to
achieve this result," therefore there is no constitutional problem under Article J1.83
IV. Binational Panels & Constitutionality Under the Due Process Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.
A. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.
Amendment V to the U.S. Constitution states "[N]o person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law... ."84 "The right of access to the courts... is
one of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution."85 Exactly how an alleged due
78. Harold H. Bruff, Can Buckley Clear Customs?, 49 WASH & LEE L. REv. 1309, 1312-13 (1992); see
also Moyer, supra note 26, at 712.
79. Davey, supra note 74, at 1319-20; Moyer, supra note 26, at 712.
80. Davey, supra note 74, at 1319-20.
81. Moyer, supra note 26, at 712; see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-
21(1936).
82. JAMEs R. CANNON, JR., RESOLVING DispurEs UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER 19 249 (1994).
83. Id.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Amendment V declares in full:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness agains himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.
Id.
85. Patricia Kelmar, Binational Panels of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement in Action:
The Constitutional Challenge Continues, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 173, 203 (1993).
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process violation is examined was explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in 197 0.86
B. GOLDBERG V. KELLY.
In the case of Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court stated four criteria for determin-
ing a due process violation: "(1) was the action performed under the direction and control
of the government; (2) is a life, liberty, or property interest affected; (3) what process is
due; and (4) has the government provided such process."87
1. Action Performed Under Governmental Direction and Control.
The binational panel process is "clearly action performed under the direction and
control of the U.S. Government."88 "[S]everal of the binational panelists are appointed by
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and therefore are acting under authority of
the U.S. Government."89 The U.S. Government also directly limited Article III review of
antidumping and countervailing duty disputes involving the United States, Canada, and
Mexico by entering into the NAFTA with these countries.90 Based on the above, the bina-
tional dispute resolution process falls under the first criteria of the test set forth by the
Supreme Court.
2. Life, Liberty, or Property Interest.
Antidumping and countervailing duty cases certainly pertain to property interests.91
An antidumping duty is defined as "[tiariff, [the] purpose of which is to prevent imports
of goods for sale at a lower price than that charged in the country of origin."92 "Importers
have a property interest because they are subject to duties, [which are] property in the
form of currency."93 There is also an argument that the right to trade fairly between
nations is also a property interest, in that there is an expectation of an ability to participate
in a market that assures fair competition.94
86. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg involved the question of whether a welfare
recipient's interest in continued receipt of welfare benefits was a statutory entitlement that
amounted to property within the meaning of the due process clause. Id. The Court held that the
interest was a statutory entitlement within the meaning of the due process clause, referring to the
brutal need of welfare recipients. Id.




91. Kelmar, supra note 85, at 204.
92. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 93 (6th ed. 1990).
93. Kelmar, supra note 85, at 204.
94. Id.
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The Supreme Court established a balancing test to determine when due process is
required to protect a property interest in Mathews v. Eldridg 95 This test includes examin-
ing: 1) the private interest affected; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest
through the procedures used; and 3) the government's interest.96 Under this test, private
interests are weighed against government interests to see if the use of binational panels is
justified.97
Issues before binational panels affect "the private interest in the freedom to do busi-
ness."98 A duty or tariff placed on imports has a direct impact on those persons doing
business in that particular field.99 Regarding the second prong of the Mathews test, there
is a risk of panel decisions containing erroneous deprivations of private interests, a risk of
panel decisions containing egregious errors under U.S. law.100 The government also has a
significant interest in that the amount of trade between the NAFTA countries has dramati-
cally increased since its implementation.' 0' But the private interests of thousands of U.S.
producers outweigh those of the government.10 2
3. Due Process.
Under Goldberg v. Kelly, a fair and impartial judiciary is required to meet due process.10 3
Since binational panelists "are picked through an inherently political process' it is possible
Parties before the panels are not receiving decisions from a fair and impartial body.104 Also,
importers and producers of products that are exported to Canada are subject to different
types of due process protections, because "Congress has not limited the right to judicial
review to all trading businesses but only to those trading with Canada. " 105 Those businesses
dealing with Canada are treated differently than those dealing with other countries. 106
4. Government Process.
As seen above, the government has not provided the same due process protections to
all U.S. companies. 107 Businesses are treated differently depending upon with whom they
95. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews involved the termination of further disability benefits after a
review of the recipient's response to a questionnaire about his condition, reports from his physi-
cian and psychiatric consultant, and his files. Id. The Supreme Court held that because the prior
recipient was informed of the termination, was given a statement of reasons for the termination,
and was offered an opportunity to submit a written response, the procedure did not violate the
Due Process Clause. Id.
96. Id.
97. Kelmar, supra note 85, at 206.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 205.
101. Id. at 206.
102. Id.
103. 397 U.S. 254,273-74 (1970).
104. Kelmar, supra note 85, at 206.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 207.
107. Id. at 206.
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are dealing, leading to disparate treatment and results. 108 Businesses do not receive the
same procedure for review based solely upon with whom they are dealing.109 In short, the
government has not provided the required due process under Amendment V of the U.S.
Constitution to those citizens engaged in business with Canada and Mexico.
V. Binational Panels & Constitutionality Under the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
A. EQUAL PROTECrION CLAUSE.
The Equal Protection Clause is a provision in the 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution which states "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." 110 Much like under a due process analysis, domestic
Parties petitioning under the antidumping or countervailing duty laws are "treated differ-
ently," depending upon whether those Parties are dealing with Canada, Mexico, or some
other country. 111 The Supreme Court of the United States set out the criteria to be
applied under an equal protection analysis in 1973.112
B. FRONTIERO V. RICHARDSON.
The U.S. Supreme Court developed a two-part analysis to be applied in determining
whether there is an equal protection infirmity in Frontiero v. Richardson.113 The first step
of analysis is inquiring whether or not the party to be examined falls within a suspect class
or category, such as questions of gender or ethnic discrimination. 114 A second question
under equal protection analysis is whether or not the distinction is arbitrary or bears no
rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. 11 5
C. APPLICATION OF EQUAL PROTECrION ANALYSIS TO BINATIONAL PANELS.
The action of binational panels does not "raise a question" which "would fall within a
suspect category."'' 1 6 The question is not the same as in the case of gender or ethnic dis-
crimination, where those allegedly harmed are a suspect class or category, based upon an
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Amendment XIV, Section 1, states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United states, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United states and of the State wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United states; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
111. CANNON, JR., supra note 82, at 252.
112. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 686-88.
115. Id. at 683.
116. CANNON, JR., supra note 82, at 254.
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immutable characteristic determined solely at birth."17 Those affected by the use of bina-
tional panels chose to conduct business that would subject them to binational panels and
are thus not entitled to the heightened standard of review available to suspect classes. 118
Businesses are not a member of a suspect class because they do not have an immutable
characteristic determined solely at birth. 1 19
The distinction must be sustained, therefore, because equal protection analysis does
not proceed to the second level of inquiry, whether or not the distinction is arbitrary or
bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest, unless the Party falls
within a suspect class or category.120 Even though the binational panel process might fail
under due process analysis, the distinction between binational panels and courts must be
sustained because the Party subject to panel review does not fall within a suspect class or
category so as to render the process in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 120
VI. Binational Panels & Constitutionality Under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution.
A. ARTICLE III.
Article III of the U.S. Constitution raises perhaps the strongest constitutional challenge to
the NAFTA Chapter 19 binational panels. 122 Article III vests the judicial power of the United
States "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the congress may-... estab-
lish."123 Article III also provides federal judges with life tenure during good behavior and
requires that each judge's compensation will not be diminished during his or her continuance
in office. 124 Section 2 states that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the
Constitution and the laws of the United States to controversies in which the United States is a
117. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 677.




122. Kelmar, supra note 85, at 208.
123. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The full text of Article III, § 1, states:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Id.
124. Id.
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party and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. 125
Although Article III contains "relatively dear provisions," it is"one of the most complex areas
of American constitutional law."126 Before examining Article III's application to the constitu-
tionality question of binational panels, a review of recent Article III case law is appropriate to
gain a dearer picture of how the Article III provisions are applied.
B. RECENT ARTICLE III CASE LAw.
1. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 127 the U.S. Supreme
Court stated two purposes underlying Article III: (1) to preserve the system of checks and
balances in the constitutional structure; and (2) to protect the impartiality of the federal
judiciary. 128 The Court went on to state there are two types of exceptions that will survive
constitutional challenge under Article III: (1) so-called legislative courts, which include
territorial courts, courts martial, and public rights cases; and (2) the adjunct system, where
a non-Article III body is attached to the federal district court system. 129
Northern Pipeline involved the "constitutionality of the non-Article III bankruptcy courts
created by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.1' 130 "The bankruptcy courts are not Article III courts
125. Id. at § 2, d. 1. The full text of Article III, § 2, clause 1, states:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more
States;-- between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different
States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
Id.
126. Metropoulos, supra note 2, at 150.
127. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
128. Id. at 58.
129. Id. at 63.
130. Boyer, supra note 39, at 115. The Bankruptcy Act established an adjunct system of bankruptcy
courts attached to federal district courts which had the power to review the decisions of the
bankruptcy judges. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53; Boyer, supra note 39, at 115. Bankruptcy
judges are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a term of 14
years, and can be removed only for incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or mental or
physical disability. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53; Boyer, supra note 39, at 115. The bankrupt-
cy judges' salaries are set by federal statute and may be adjusted pursuant to federal statute.
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53; Boyer, supra note 39, at 115.
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because the judges do not have life tenure and are not protected against salary diminution" 13 1
Marathon Pipe Line Company alleged that the courts violated Article 111.132 A majority of the
Supreme Court agreed, but no opinion achieved a sufficient number of votes.
133
The plurality explained that the legislative territorial courts and courts martial "dearly
could not be used to justify the bankruptcy court system" 134 The plurality went on to argue
that the legislative courts that handle public rights cases are based on the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.)35 "[Plublic rights must at a minimum arise between the government and others"
whereas "private rights concern... the liability of one individual to another."'
136
The plurality argued that the "bankruptcy courts had jurisdiction over a broad range
of state created rights," which were "quintessentially private rights since they concerned the
liability of one individual to another."137 Because of this, "the bankruptcy court system
could not be justified as a system of public rights legislative courts. 138
As for the second type of exception, the adjunct system, the plurality noted that
adjuncts may perform certain adjudicative functions "as long as the essential attributes of
judicial power remain in Article III courts' 139 Although adjuncts can perform basic func-
tions, "more fundamental questions of law... must remain in Article III courts.' 14
The plurality noted "that Congress created the bankruptcy court system as an adjunct
to the federal district courts," but the bankruptcy courts possessed "many judicial attribut-
es," such as: "broad civil jurisdiction over any claims related to the federal bankruptcy
laws, including state law claims"; "all the ordinary powers of a district court, including the
power to enforce its own decisions"; and the right to have their decisions reviewed "in fed-
eral district court using only a highly deferential standard." 141 Because Congress had
removed so many of the essential attributes of judicial power from Article III courts, 142 the
plurality held that Congress exceeded its "minimal power, and thus held the bankruptcy
court system unconstitutional. 143
131. Boyer, supra note 39, at 115. Although bankruptcy judges do not have life tenure and are not
protected against salary diminution, the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction was broad. Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 54. After the filing of a petition under the federal bankruptcy laws, "the
[bankruptcy] courts have jurisdiction over all civil proceedings ... arising under or related to the
bankruptcy action.' Boyer, supra note 39, at 115. "The courts could hold jury trials and issue
declaratory judgments, certain habeas corpus and other writs, and any orders or judgments nec-
essary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the federal bankruptcy laws," but "they could
not enjoin other courts or sanction criminal contempt in certain instances." Id. Bankruptcy
court decisions could be appealed to the federal circuit courts. Id.
132. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 50.
133. Boyer, supra note 39, at 116.
134. Id.
135. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-68.





141. Id. at 118.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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2. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.
In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products CO., 144 the Court adopted a "less
structured analysis of congressional delegations of judicial authority to non-Article III
bodies."145 Thomas involved "a system of negotiation and binding arbitration used to
resolve disputes under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)."1 46
Congress amended FIFRA to require negotiation and, if necessary, binding arbitration, to
determine whether or not compensation paid by a follow-on registrant to a previous regis-
trant for use of previously submitted insecticide data was adequate. 147 "The arbitrator's
decision was subject to judicial review only for fraud, misrepresentation, or other miscon-
duct."'148 Certain pesticide manufacturers who had previously submitted data to the
Environmental Protection Agency challenged the arbitration system on the grounds that it
violated Article III.149
The Thomas Court clearly stated that Northern Pipeline "did not define the scope and
nature of Article III's requirements."150 The Court "emphasized that in Northern Pipeline
the Court only held that Congress cannot give a non-Article III court jurisdiction over tra-
ditional contract action arising under state law without consent of the litigants, and sub-
ject only to ordinary appellate review."151 The Court "vowed to pay practical attention to
substance when determining the application of Article III" but did not elaborate on how
this would apply in practice. 152 The Court did not state whether it considered the FIFRA
arbitration system to be an adjunct or a legislative court.153 In the end, the Court hedged
or "compromised its analysis in order to uphold the scheme' rendering "prediction of
future outcomes difficult." 154
3. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,155 the Supreme Court embraced
an ad hoc balancing test "for assessing congressional delegations of judicial authority to
non-article III bodies."156 Schor involved "a challenge to the authority of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) to hear
144. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
145. Boyer, supra note 39, at 118.
146. Id. FIFRA required pesticide manufacturers to submit research data on pesticides before registra-
tion of pesticide products. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 571; Boyer, supra note 39, at 118. Under FIFRA,
subsequent follow-on registrants of the same or similar insecticide could use the previously sub-
mitted data provided the first registrant was adequately compensated. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 572;
Boyer, supra note 39, at 118.
147. Boyer, supra note 39, at 118.
148. Id. at 118.
149. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 575-76; Boyer, supra note 39, at 118-19.
150. Boyer, supra note 39, at 119.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Boyer, supra note 39, at 119.
154. Id. at 120.
155. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
156. Boyer, supra note 39, at 123.
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state law counterclaims in broker-client reparations proceedings."157 Schor challenged the
constitutionality of the CFTC's jurisdiction over common law counterclaims. 158 "The
Court announced that it would not adhere to formalistic and rigid rules which would
unduly restrict Congress' ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its
Article I powers."' 59 The Court decided once again to ignore the distinction drawn in
Northern Pipeline between legislative courts and administrative adjuncts.160
The Court found that Article III served two purposes: (1) safeguarding the impartial-
ity of the judiciary; and (2) preserving the role of an independent judiciary in the constitu-
tional scheme of a three-way government by keeping one branch from benefiting at the
expense of another. 161 Applying the first purpose, the court found that Schor waived any
right to an Article III forum when he chose to invoke the CFTC's procedure. 162
The Court then examined several factors under the second purpose. 163 The Court
first examined "the extent to which the essential attributes of judicial power are reserved in
Article III courts' 164 The Court found that the CFTC did not exercise many judicial pow-
ers, and that "the CFTC reparations system left many of the essential attributes of judicial
power to Artide III courts' 165
Next, the Court examined the "nature and importance of the right at issue."166 The
Court concluded that the CFTC's jurisdiction over a narrow class of claims and the fact
that the federal judiciary was not divested of its jurisdiction over the particular class of
claims meant that the province of the judicial branch was not encroached. 167 The Court
then "examined the concerns that motivated Congress to delegate authority to the
CFTC"'168 "The Court concluded that the delegation of counterclaim jurisdiction was not
an attempt to undermine Article III values through control of judicial function but to pro-
mote the legitimate regulatory purposes of Congress."169
"The Court's precedents require that congressional action be examined in light of the
157. Id. at 121. Congress envisioned that such proceedings would "be an inexpensive and expeditious
alternative to federal courts which customers could choose to redress fraudulent activity by com-
modity brokers." Id. Along with its jurisdiction over CEA-based claims, the CFTC exercised
"authority in reparations proceedings to adjudicate all counterclaims arising out of the disputed
transaction or transactions.' Id.
158. Schor, 478 U.S. at 838. The dispute arose when Schor, a customer, "used the reparations proceed-
ings of the CFTC to charge his commodity broker with violations of the CEA?' Boyer, supra note
39, at 121. "The broker counterclaimed [in order] to recover expenses and other debts" Schor
had incurred on his commodity account. Id
159. Boyer, supra note 39, at 121.
160. Id.
161. Schor, 478 U.S. at 850; Boyer, supra note 39, at 121-22.
162. Boyer, supra note 39, at 122.
163. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
164. Boyer, supra note 39, at 122.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Schor, 478 U.S. at 850; Boyer, supra note 39, at 123.
168. Boyer, supra note 39, at 123.
169. Id.
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two values that underlie Article III." 170 The test boils down to assessing the "benefits of
using the congressional scheme... functionally in terms of its fairness to litigants and its
effects on the structural role of an independent judiciary with the tripartite system of gov-
ernment" (separation of powers). 171
C. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE III ANALYSIS TO BINATIONAL PANELS.
Upon initial evaluation of binational panels on the face of Article III, it appears these
panels are not consistent with Article 111.172 The U.S Supreme Court, in Reid v. Covert,
stated "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any
other branch of government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution." 173
The Supreme Court has consistently given supremacy to the Constitution over treaties. 174
Binational panels violate Article III in that they do not ensure that decisions by the
panels will be free from political pressures of Congress and the Executive, a stated purpose
of Article 111.175 Binational panels do not ensure freedom from political pressures because
binational panelists "do not satisfy its [Article III] requirements of salary stability and [life]
tenure.' 176 But the analysis of binational panels under Article III is not such a simple task
that the analysis ends there.
"The Constitution requires that disputes before the binational panels be heard in an
Article III court."177 The Schor Court stated that in order to determine whether Article III
review is mandated, the Court must examine "the dispute mechanism in relation to the two
purposes underlying Article III": (1) separation of powers and (2) an impartial judiciary. 178
1. Separation of Powers.
Delegating power to an international panel composed of U.S., Canadian, and/or
Mexican citizens threatens the balance of power between all three branches of government
and particularly the power of Article III courts. 179 Congress and the President agreed to
implement the binational panel process of the NAFTA and in so doing established "an
unconstitutional dispute resolution procedure that... weaken[s] the power of all three
branches [of government] :"180
The binational panel process removes power from the federal courts by precluding
review by an Article III court of international trade matters. 181 The separation of powers is
170. Id.
171. Id. at 124.
172. See Kelmar, supra note 85, at 208 (contending that the binational dispute mechanism violates
Article III).
173. 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
174. Kelmar, supra note 85, at 185.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 190.
178. Schor, 478 U.S. at 850; Kelmar, supra note 85, at 190.




threatened because the power of the judiciary is diminished by the actions of Congress and
the President.182 The Schor Court considered the extent to which the essential attributes
of judicial power reserved to Article III courts were being tread upon. 183 Although the
Court determined there that the judiciary was not threatened because of the "narrow sub-
set of issues being determined by the CFTC" 184 this same rationale does not apply to bina-
tional panel decisions under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA. Binational panel decisions have a
"substantial impact on U.S. trade' and are not limited to a narrow subset of issues.185
"[Tihe NAFTA covers trade issues affecting approximately 360 million people and a
combined economy of $6 trillion' 186 Many U.S. industries "could be devastated if the
power to determine antidumping or countervailing duty issues continues to shift from
Article III courts to binational or multinational panels."187
Another serious separation of powers problem is the "complete lack of appellate
review" of binational panel decisions by U.S. courts for any question of law or fact. 188
Appellate review, involving the authority to decide questions of law, "is perhaps the most
crucial of the essential judicial attributes that should be left to Article III courts."189 The
Supreme Court in Thomas and in Schor ignored the distinction between legislative courts
and administrative adjuncts and listed "the availability of review by an Article III court as a
positive factor for upholding the respective congressional scheme" 190 Although the Court
has not held that such review shall be required in every case, 191 the fact that the Court
views the existence of some appellate review as a positive factor lends strong support to the
position that the lack of such appellate review for binational panel decisions leads to a sep-
aration of powers problem.
2. Impartial Judiciary.
Article III protects the rights of litigants to an impartial judiciary by preventing the
other branches from influencing the courts. 192 In Schor, the appellant waived the right to
Article III adjudication because he consented to the jurisdiction of the CFTC. 193 But in
the NAFTA binational panels, U.S. litigants have no choice but to submit to the binational
panels and are allowed no opportunity to consent to non-Article III adjudication. 194
The NAFTA binational panel system provides little protection against political influ-
ence from outside sources. 195 A panelist's re-appointment to the panel roster may be
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183. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
184. Kelmar, supra note 85, at 191.
185. Id. at 192.
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directly affected by the nature of his or her decisions, 196 unlike Article III judges who have
a set salary and life tenure. Although some would argue that the availability of constitu-
tional review under the extraordinary challenge procedure of Chapter 19 "protects liti-
gants' fairness interests" 197 as discussed in Part II of this comment, the availability of the
challenge procedure is unlikely and, at best, ineffective. 198Although there is nothing intrinsically wrong with judges without Article III status
determining U.S. law, a decision-maker appointed under the authority of the United
States determining questions of federal law "without any possibility of review by an Article
III judge" raises serious concerns.1 99 There exists "a rather strong consensus" that this sit-
uation which allows for no reviewability is "of dubious constitutionality."200 "Because cus-
toms duty suits have had a long history in common law and are inherently judicial,
antidumping and countervailing duty disputes should be settled in Article III courts."201
VII. Cases Challenging the Constitutionality of Binational Panels.
A. NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR INDUS. DEFENSE, INC. V. UNITED STATES.
In National Council for Indus. Defense, Inc. v. United States,202 the NCID and the
American Engineering Association (AEA) challenged the binational panel process of
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as a violation of the U.S.
Constitution. 203 The NCID is a non-profit organization which works to foster "the
strengthening of those endangered American production facilities and work forces which
contribute to the industrial capacity of the United States."204 The AEA is a non-profit
group that hopes to "enhance the status of the American engineering profession and relat-
ed occupations and to support activities for the employment of Americans in the engi-
neering profession."205
The NCID and the AEA alleged violations of Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution
and the Due Process Clause, and claimed that their membership was "adversely affected" by
196. Boyer, supra note 39, at 125.
197. See id.
198. Deyling, supra note 56, at 379.
199. Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional Theory, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 845, 873 (1996).
200. Id.
201. Kelmar, supra note 85, at 208.
202. 827 F. Supp. 794 (D.D.C. 1993).
203. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 293 [hereinafter
FTA]. The FTA is an agreement containing numerous provisions, including binational panels,
which were adopted by the NAFTA.
204. NCID, 827 F. Supp. at 796.
205. Id.
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Chapter 19's unconstitutional nature.20 6 The associations were concerned that panel mem-
bers had been attorneys who represented international business interests and were "therefore
antagonistic to the fair implementation of the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty
laws;' not the impartial panelists that were expected to compose binational panels.207
The plaintiff associations failed to bring their action in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, as was required in the implementing legisla-
tion of the FTA for challenging the constitutionality of the FTA binational panel
process.208 The plaintiffs instead brought their action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia.209 The District Court dismissed the matter for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and in so doing, "rejected plaintiffs' argument that, because they were
calling for all of Chapter 19 of the FTA to be declared unconstitutional, including the por-
tion giving jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals, they therefore had to assert jurisdiction
under, inter alia, the Administrative Procedure Act and the federal question doctrine.
" 2 10
Because of the jurisdictional defect in the plaintiffs' filing, the court did not reach the
issue of the constitutionality of the binational panel process. The constitutionality ques-
tion was not raised again until 1994, in the case of Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports v.
United States.
B. COALITION FOR FAIR LUMBER IMPORTS V. UNITED STATES.
In Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports v. United States,211 the plaintiffs challenged the
Chapter 19 binational process arising out of lumber determinations. 212 Unlike the plain-
tiffs in National Council for Indus. Defense, Inc. v. United States, the "plaintiffs [here] were
the petitioners in the underlying countervailing duty determination at issue in the Lumber
panel proceedings." 2 13 The plaintiffs also filed in the venue specified by statute, so the
standing and jurisdiction problems facing the plaintiffs in NCID were not present here.2 14
The plaintiff's complaint challenged the Chapter 19 binational panel process "as a
denial of due process to the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports'" 215 The complaint also
206. Kelmar, supra note 85, at 184. The plaintiffs specifically contended that Chapter 19 violates: (1)
Article I by ceding judicial powers to the binational panels; (2) the Appointments Clause of
Article II by vesting judicial power in panelists without the advice and consent of the Senate; (3)
Article III by vesting judicial power in a tribunal other than the Supreme court or such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish; and (4) the Fifth
Amendment by depriving plaintiff's members and other citizens of due process and equal pro-
tection of the laws. NCID, 827 F. Supp. At 794. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare the bina-
tional panels devoid of authority to review, reverse, or modify the decisions of U.S. trade agencies
and to declare the U.S. legislation that implements Chapter 19 to be null and void. Id.
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challenged the constitutionality of the Chapter 19 system and its implementing legislation
on four grounds: "(1) as violative of the Appointments Clause, Article II of the
Constitution; (2) as violative of the separation of powers doctrine; (3) as violative of due
process under the Fifth Amendment; and (4) as violative of the equal protection rights
implicit in the Fifth Amendment' 2 16
This case, unlike NCID, "squarely raised" the constitutional issues presented in this com-
ment without any procedural defects. 2 17 Alas, the court had no opportunity to rule on the
matter as the case was settled before a decision on the merits could be reached;218 the consti-
tutional questions raised by this case and by scholars remain unanswered by a court of law.
VIII. Conclusion.
The continued use of Chapter 19 binational panels raises serious constitutional issues. 219
Although binational panels seem to withstand constitutional challenges arising under Article
II and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, there are strong arguments arising
from other constitutional provisions to question the validity of binational panels. 220
The strongest argument that the panels are unconstitutional arises under Article III of
the U.S. Constitution.22 1 Binational panelists do not qualify under Article III because they
are not life-tenured judges and because they do not have guaranteed salary protection.222
Binational panels do not ensure that their decisions will be free from the political pressures
of Congress and the Executive Branch.223 A panelist's re-appointment to the panel roster
is often contingent upon how he or she decides certain cases, an infirmity not present in
the decisions of Article III judges. 224
Binational panels threaten the separation of powers by diminishing the power of the
judiciary by removing from it the ability to hear cases that will have a substantial impact
on U.S. trade.225 U.S. courts are left with no appellate review of binational panel proceed-
ings for any question of law or fact.226
There is also a strong argument that the binational panel process is unconstitutional
under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.227 The U.S. Government has not
provided the same due process protections to all U.S. companies. 228 Businesses are treat-
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Although Chapter 19 of the NAFTA allows for constitutional challenges to the bina-
tional panel process in limited circumstances, many obstacles make judicial review of the
panel system unlikely and, if attained, ineffective. 230 Only two cases thus far have chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the binational panel process.231
It has been said that if the binational process is ever successffully challenged on consti-
tutional grounds, "then that's the end of the FTA, and the NAFTA. And the WTO isn't
worth the paper it's printed on."2 32 Even if this is true, the private interests of thousands
of U.S. producers who may not receive fair hearings under the binational panel system
outweigh the public interest.233 The panel system violates important features of the U.S.
Constitution and should be abolished or vitally reworked in order to comply with the
Constitution.
As the United States contemplates entering into similar agreements with other coun-
tries, binational panels could be become even more important and influential in the inter-
national trade context.234 If the binational panel process is not abolished or substantially
reorganized, "more U.S. companies and more U.S. goods will be subject to the decisions of
panels that violate constitutional protections."235
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232. Maclaren Says Canada Expects Payment of Lumber Duties Despite Legal Action, 11 Int'l Trade Rep.
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Corrigendum
In Volume 3, Number 2, the final sentence of David Lopez's Dispute Resolution Under
MERCOSUR from 1991 to 1996: Implication for the Formation of a Free Trade Area of the
Americas was printed incorrectly. Page 33 of our Volume 3, Number 2, should be replaced
by the following page. The article, Peru: How Problems in the Framework for Secured
Transactions LimitAccess to Credit, should have started on page 34.
